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Summary 
The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Next Generation Air Transportation (NextGen) 
program is a long-term modernization and transformation of the current National Airspace System (NAS) 
into a more effective and coordinated decision-making system. NextGen provides a more reliable, secure, 
and dependable aviation capability for both users and operators ensuring more capacity, throughput, and 
safety. This research delineates a high-level Safety Risk Assessment (SRA) related to NextGen 
technologies, specifically Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) as well 
as Aircraft Access to System Wide Information Management (SWIM) network (AAtS). Other 
communication mediums such as Mode-S or ADS-B transponder are also data exchange and broadcast 
capabilities in the aircraft can also be prone to lower level safety risks primarily because of an inability to 
ensure information security. 
Scope  
In the context of information security/protection, a threat agent (threat source) is an individual, 
instance, or component that poses danger to assets which need to be protected. Figure 1 depicts typical 
ACARS system components: (a) Multi Communication Display Unit (MCDU), (b) Flight Management 
System (FMS), (c) Autopilot, the Flight Deck Interval Management (FIM) Equipment, (d) 
Communication Management Unit (CMU), and (e) datalink. Details such as various Instrument Flight 
Rules (IFR) points, flight plan, and navigation points are programmed into FMS, and the aircraft 
essentially follows these commands via the autopilot. Aside from these components, AAtS aircraft assets 
typically include Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) and onboard internet router and modem.  
FMS/
FIM
MCDU
CMU
VHF 
Receiver
Onboard 
Internet 
Modem
Satelite/
Cellular 
Receiver
EFB
Onboard AAtS Equipment
Onboard ACARS Equipment
Autopilot
Aircraft
 
Figure 1. Major ACARS and AAtS Onboard Components 
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) defines a threat as “Any circumstance or event 
with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or 
reputation), organizational assets, or individuals through an information system via unauthorized access, 
destruction, disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of service.” Attack vectors are routers 
or means by which a threat agent can influence assets or legitimate access to assets.  
Based on this definition we will classify threat actions as:  
 Access: simple unauthorized access (e.g. unauthorized access to FMS, or EFB) 
 Misuse: unauthorized use of assets (e.g. unauthorized use of CMU, or onboard internet router) 
 Disclosure: unauthorized and illicit disclosure of information (e.g. publishing FMS or EFB 
credentials or confidential data) 
 Modification: making unauthorized changes to an asset (e.g. modifying the route submitted via 
ACARS, or modify weather data, or Air Traffic Control (ATC) Winds or Air Operations Center 
(AOC) Winds data) 
 Denial of access: blocking legitimate users from accessing assets (e.g. consuming bandwidth and/or 
blocking MCDU logon access to Air Route Traffic Control Centers also known as ARTCC stations) 
 
Within scope of the NextGen program is integration of Trajectory-Based Operations (TBO) with 
ACARS and AAtS systems. Use of air/ground Aeronautical Telecommunication Network Baseline 2 
(ATN-B2) data communications; flight object; integration of Air Traffic Management (ATM); Flight 
Operations Center (FOC); and aircraft trajectory communication systems for advanced trajectory 
exchange in ATM capitalizes the role of SRA research on ACARS. Proposed new capabilities such as 
Dynamic-Required Navigational Performance (D-RNP), Advanced flight Interval Management (A-IM), 
and ATC winds are examples of the exchange of mission critical data over ACRS. In addition, A-IM 
Concepts of Operations (ConOP) developed by the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, or 
RTCA, and provided by Special Committees SC-186 and SC-214 released on March 27, 2014, and 
subsequent releases advocate for incorporating TBO communication via ACARS and directly loading it 
into FMS/FIM equipment.  Flight deck Data Communication equipment will provide a “direct load” 
capability that will allow loading Advanced Information Management (IM) application clearance 
information, including Target IFPI, directly into the FIM equipment.  These features, while they increase 
automation and agility of aircraft systems, pose significant security risks to onboard flight control 
equipment, when proper policies, equipment, and encryption of data is not used. 
On the other hand, AAtS Implementation guidance released March 1, 2013, states that “Information is 
intended to support but not directly change the trajectory of the aircraft. Examples of non-trajectory 
affecting information include wind, temperature and turbulence information for presentation to the pilot 
or upload into the flight management function (FMF).” Although AAtS is not currently planned to carry 
direct trajectory related data, there are non-mission critical data transferred via this medium that directly 
affect situational-awareness and subsequently decision making of the flight crew.  
Threat Agent Identification and Assessment Methodology  
There are certain challenges in securely delivering the ATC/AOC clearances/instructions via 
ACARS to the MCDU and vice-versa that must be addressed and overcome. In this research, we are 
identifying sets of potential and imminent threats including threat vectors regarding information transfer 
within ACARS and AAtS framework. The risk factor for each threat can be analyzed and determined 
based on the categorization proposed in Document DO-178C software development standard. Software 
level determination and failure-condition categorization processes need to be followed to assess threats 
and their severity. Potential measures to address threats and mitigation strategies are also needed. In the 
following subsections, we discuss overarching threat categories that needs to be further investigated for 
ACARS and AAtS. It must be mentioned that these are not all the threat categories and more in-depth 
research and collaboration with stakeholders (i.e. aircraft avionics manufactures, datalink service 
providers, data management service providers …) will shape the ultimate SRA assessment.  
Denial of Service to ACARS/AAtS Resources 
Denial of Service (DoS) is the mechanism in which an attacker attempts to saturate network 
resources to the degree that computing components of the network are no longer able to process requests 
due to overload conditions in the network. This will cause onboard MCDU, EFB, CMU, router, modem, 
and other components to get out of reach and halt services produced by them. Currently, ACARS 
communication protocols such as Controller Pilot Datalink Communication (CPDLC), Aeronautical 
Radio Inc. (ARINC 702), and ADS-C are not encrypted and are operating based on a trusted network. All 
current aviation communications are unauthenticated and unencrypted whether sent by aircraft or ground 
ATC systems.  
ACARS/AAtS Datalink Mapping 
In assessing vulnerability and security of a network, any loose node that does not follow security 
standards can be a foothold for attackers to get into more sensitive parts of networks and databases. 
Network mapping is one strategy used by attackers to locate vulnerable nodes in a network and breach 
them. By using Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) techniques and tools, it is possible to map 
ACARS/AAtS networks and aircraft components and services without actually sending any packets (or 
just a few standard requests). An unauthenticated user of ACARS (due to lack of proper authentication 
mechanisms) might be able to conduct reconnaissance on datalink provider’s network to map networks 
along with fingerprinting aircraft CMUs, MCDUs, EFBs, etc.  
ACARS/AAtS Data Encryption 
Network communication certificates such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure Socket 
Layer (SSL) protocols protect network users in two-way communications. The goal is to maintain privacy 
of data by establishing encryption on data being communicated as well as authenticating identity of 
senders and receivers. Due to lack of encryption in ACARS air to ground communications as well as the 
onboard ARINC 429 data-bus, a potential attacker can easily sniff data and possibly modify/omit 
messages, navigational databases on FMSs, or autopilot control loops. As it was mentioned earlier, direct 
loading of ATC route and instructions into FMSs is a future goal of the NextGen program, posing a 
potential threat to aircraft’s safety. On the other hand, limited encryption is used in AAtS that might allow 
attack on the certificate authority of EFB using rouge certificates.  
Man-In-The-Middle Attack to ACARS/AAtS Datalink 
Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) refers to an attacker’s effort in relaying and possibly altering data 
transfer within network components. The attacker intercepts all communication between two victims who 
believe they are communicating directly. Using Software-Defined Radio (SDR), software, and ACARS 
communication standards (e.g. CPDLC, ATN-B1/B2) available on the Internet, a transmitter/receiver unit 
can be built and used to spoof an ATC ground station or another aircraft. Attackers can rouge FMS 
impersonating the real FMS to conduct MITM attack on ACARS data traffic to tATC/AOC, due to lack 
of a secured authentication mechanism in ACARS.  
Human Factors 
 Akopyan and Yelakov (2009), called cybercrimes a global disaster that needs to be corrected, in 
discussing cyber security, it is important to consider human factors associated with cyber security. As 
stated by Bowen and Stolfo (2012), computer security is not just about technology but those people that 
use systems and how their behaviors can lead to exploitation. Widdowson and Goodliff (2015), indicated 
that the human element contributed to over 95% of all security incidents. In considering human factors 
associated with cyber security, the CHEAT model could be used, of which 57 human factors derive the 
model in five categories: (a) technology, (b) people, (c) organization, (d) history, and (e) environment. 
This model allows for a proactive assessment of vulnerability and root causes of human-related events. 
The model works by not only identifying root causes but then identifying solutions. In considering 
exploitation of the human side, solid metrics will be needed to assess vulnerabilities before deployment of 
resources. Carr (2016), advocated a cyber-security strategy that focuses on both public and private 
partnerships in mitigation of cyber security threats. Applying this approach to the human factors side, risk 
assessment and training is critical before corporations should invest in overseas markets. White, Hewitt, 
and Kruck (2013) indicated that, in order to reduce human factors, cyber security needs to be a core 
component of the organization. 
Conclusions 
To properly pinpoint and mitigate these potential risks, an engineering team should refine the 
identified threats and initial risk assessment. Failure condition categorization based on DO-178C 
standards for large transport category aircraft based on established advisory material for system safety 
assessment processes need to be carried out. Once threat mitigation strategies are developed, a 
comprehensive test plan for the two mentioned SRAs, and any additional SRAs proposed by FAA with 
verification of mitigation strategies need to be developed and tested. These tests are expected to result in 
both real and national information security threat mitigation strategies, network architectures for assured 
security and quality of service, and a better understanding of limitations/capabilities of ACARS and 
AAtS. A set of authentication and data encryption techniques along with their pros and cons as well as 
their suitability must be identified and implemented on these networks. In addition, a set of desired 
security measures including those that need to be implemented on ACARS and AAtS resources, servers, 
routers, modems, and computing systems need to be established and standardized as recommendations 
and mitigation strategies. 
Examining Marketing opportunities for Cyber Security Companies to meet the 
Threats of Cyber Security in Aviation 
Air Traffic Management (ATM) is complex and further complexity comes from Cyber Security 
threats. Cyber-attacks in ATM are of concern in the aviation industry and there have been market studies 
around both threats to and business opportunities for companies that are able to find vulnerabilities and 
offer solutions. Organizations in the aviation industry have started to hold Cyber-Security summits to 
better understand a variety of situations and look to solutions. 
In aviation, there is heavy reliance on computers to control and fly complex aircraft, and for 
coordination of all ATM movements. Some questions arise that may result in the air traveling public 
afraid to fly. Can terrorist take over airplanes? What can terrorist do to ATM or aircraft? Damage that can 
be done onboard to Information Technology (IT) systems could be devastating to safety of flight and to 
the aviation industry. Though ADS-B is designed to move aircraft safely and efficiently these systems are 
an “open architecture,” there is risk in use of it in highly dense areas or air traffic so the risk vs the 
strengths are crucial to aviation.-I’m not comfortable making these changes, I do not want to alter the 
intent. However, I do believe this section needs revision.  
*The State of Security from Tripwire, Lane Thames in June of 2015 wrote “Did The Aviation 
Industry Fail Cybersecurity 101 and it he discussed the infamous tweet that a passenger on a United 
Airlines was removed for and investigated for a cyber-attack. In the article he wrote about the key 
players, what their problems are, where they failed, poor security and poor incident response, all, which 
should be troubling to the public. Recommend this be revised and the in text citation Thames be used in 
accordance with APA recommendations. 
Cyber Security measures need to identify vulnerabilities, the risks, and stakeholders, along with 
solutions. The research firm, Visiongain, conducted a report that concurs with others and agrees that it 
should be done with regions in mind, and the areas would be North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific, 
Middle East, South America, and Africa. The report also identified and provided profiles on companies 
that were believed to be leading the market. The details included 16 leading tech companies and more 
than 120 companies that are operating in the aviation cyber security market. The focus of this paper is on 
ATM opportunities, but one must realize opportunities overlap in the aviation industry and the entire 
market should be looked at in total. 
In December of 2015, there was an Aviation cyber-security think tank in Washington, DC., it 
reviewed the vulnerable points, which include WiFi, Inflight entertainment, On board mobile and pilot 
devices along with avionics, avionics’ being the way of the future for communication with ATM. The 
National Cybersecurity Center for Excellence (NCCoE) and the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) as part of the U.S Department of Commerce hosted the event. The aviation think tank 
discussed how in June of 2015, hackers were able to steal data on flight manifests, corporate data, seat 
numbers departures and other items. In their conference prelude, they reminded people that United 
American Sabre Polish carrier LOT and others have been victims of cyber-attacks. Workshops included 
undertaking the complexity of ATM and managing the vulnerability points and what does Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) future hold in technology improvements. -I recommend that the results or findings of the 
think tank should be reported and then cited per the APA. 
The State of Security from Tripwire, Lane Thames in June of 2015 wrote “Did The Aviation 
Industry Fail Cybersecurity 101 and it he discussed the infamous tweet that a passenger on a United 
Airlines was removed for and investigated for a cyber-attack. In the article he wrote about the key 
players, what their problems are, where they failed, poor security and poor incident response, all, which 
should be troubling to the public. Cyber security measures need to identify vulnerabilities, the risks, and 
stakeholders, along with solutions. –this was previously used, see * above. 
The Air Traffic Control Association (ATCA) held a cyber – security event in January 2016, 
which was after the November 2015 Aviation Cyber Conference think tank. ATCA produced a white 
paper that discussed how hardening they systems and having a strategic plan could help prevent breaches 
in ATM.-here again, I recommend that pertinent facts from the think tank be discussed and then cite the 
cyber-security event; proceedings, conference, etc. 
Organizations such as; Cyber Security Service and Solution Providers, Airlines (planes) and 
Airports (airport facilities to include Air Traffic Control) have identified the key stakeholders. They state 
that there is a market by component solution and service, by deployments On – Cloud and On – Ground 
and in agreement with Civil Air Navigation Services Organization (CANSO) and International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) on Identifying and solving the situation by Regions. 
Visiongain’s Senior Aviation Analyst and Consultant and author of “Aviation Cyber Security 
Market Forecast 2015-2025” , commented in Visiongain in March of 2015, “The threat of an aviation 
industry cyber-attack is real” (Para 1 2015). He also noted that most of the attacks have been with 
criminal or terrorist intent. He also provided in his market analysis the four submarkets, which are 
Airline/Aircraft systems, Airports systems, Computer reservations systems/ Global Distribution System 
(CRS/GDS), and Air Traffic Management systems in Cyber-security 
PRNews wire did an article on “Aviation & Defense Cyber Security Market By Component, by 
Deployment &by region –Rise in cyber-attacks is a major factor increasing the procurement of aviation 
Cyber Security Solutions and Services”. They stated,” The global aviation cyber security market is 
expected to grow from USD 39.59 billion in 2015 to USD 61.85 billion by 2020, at a Compound Annual 
Growth Rate (CAGR) of 9.34% from 2015 to 2020. Factors influencing the growth of this market include 
rise in malicious cyber-attack & cybercrimes and increase in digitization of operations in the aerospace 
and defense sector” (Para 1 2016). 
Looking for market opportunities in North and South America show there is a significant need 
and a market for cyber-security to protect avionics and other ATM equipment that would be able to 
benefit with collaboration, partnerships and joint ventures. The segments also are divided in solution type 
and security type. The increasing need for both solution type and security type solutions is creating large 
opportunities for the market. Some of the areas in the market that are growing include; identification 
access management, firewalls, antivirus and anti-malware, disaster recovery, data loss protection, and 
threat management along with risk assessment and education training. 
Markets and Markets, for state there are two types of cyber-security solutions called on-cloud and 
on premise. The on-cloud is a network based solution, and on-ground would be hard drives, and local 
equipment solutions. There are benefits and risks to both so a hybrid solution would be the best way to 
proceed. The market needs a set of technologies that have solutions and tools for the user. 
The cyber-security market is looking at consulting, design and integration, risk and threat 
assessment, managed security services and train and education. There are types of security and equipment 
security that have a growing market too. The data shows that industry experts are involved. These include 
International Business Machines Corporation (IBM), Honeywell International, INC., CISCO systems 
Inc., Raytheon, BAE, Lockheed Martin and Northrup Grumman Corporation to name some of them. 
These companies have worked with the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting 
Systems (ACARS), the components include the MCDU, FMS, FIM, CMU, and Datalink. Linkedin Pulse 
did a recent article that South America is poised to have a large CAGR over the next few years and some 
countries have adopted cyber-crime laws, which also enhances market opportunities for companies that 
are able to find the solutions for equipment that is used in more than one continent. 
 Dublin –Business reviewed a Research and Markets report that showed that there is a market for 
a cyber-security framework in the aviation industry and the trends in the market place is growing. They 
also pointed out that secure functioning of these aviation systems and safety from possible attacks is a 
collective responsibility. The stakeholders according to the article include governments, airlines and 
airports. They also point out the opportunity for business for the above companies. A Secure World Expo 
also predicted growth for the same countries and companies. 
Research of the companies and there recruitment/involvement in cyber-security shows similar 
statistics. IBM has advertised for employees in cyber-security and has also produced white papers stating 
their competency in the field and willingness to solve data breach risks. IBM in 2010 did a press release 
on their work with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in cyber-security. They have experts 
designing and building a prototype security system for the FAA complex networks. 
 Honeywell has a link on their webpage that discusses Cybersecurity, Biometric and Physical 
Security capabilities they have and are needed for companies to protect the enterprise, employees and 
customers. CISCO connected aviation has also addressed their capabilities is solving some of the aviation 
cyber-security risks. Recently they gave a press release on their work at Athens International Airport. 
Raytheon has a cyber-security operations department and is actively recruiting employees for cyber-
security positions. Lockheed Martin and Northrup Grumman also have departments.  It appears most 
major companies in Aviation cyber–security know there is a need for better security in aviation, have 
been doing the research, and they are offering solutions to the other stake holders. They are also offering 
employment opportunities as they too predict the need in the market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Advanced Interval Management (Focus: RTCA Special Committee 214 Tasking) Preliminary Concept of 
Operations, version 1.0, FAA, March 27, 2014 
 
Advanced Interval Management (A-IM) Arrival, Approach, Departure, and Defined Interval Operational 
Service Description (Final Draft), Baseline Document: ASPA-FIM SPR ED-195/DO-328 REV A, 
DRAFT V1.05, Prepared By RTCA SC-186 WG4 / WG51 
 
Aircraft Access to SWIM Implementation Guidance Document, Version 2.0, 1 March 2013 
 
ARINC Characteristic 758-2 Communications Management Unit (CMU) Mark 2. ARINC. July 2005 
 
Aviation & Defense Cyber Security Market By Component, by Deployment &by region –Rise in cyber-
attacks is a major factor increasing the procurement of aviation Cyber Security Solutions and 
Services (2016) retrieved from http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/aviation--defense-cyber-
security-market-by-component-by-deployment--by-region---forecast-to-2020-300205435.html 
 
Boeing (2013) developing a framework to Improve Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity retrieved from 
http://csrc.nist.gov/cyberframework/rfi_comments_02_2016/20160208_Boeing.pdf 
  
Business Wire (2015) Research and Markets: Global Aviation CyberSecurity Market 2014-2018 with 
Boeing (Defence, Space, and security (BDS)), Harris, IBM, Intel (incl. McAfee Inc.) & Symantec 
Dominating (2015) retrieved from 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20150127006297/en/Research-Markets-Global-Aviation-
Cyber-Security-Market  
 
CSFI ATC (Air Traffic Control) Cyber Security Project, July 16, 2015, available at: 
http://www.csfi.us/pubdocs/?id=47, accessed May 2016 
 
DO-178C Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, RTCA Committee: 
SC-205. December 13 2011 
 
Dynamic Required Navigation Performance (Focus: RTCA Special Committee 214 Tasking) Preliminary 
Concept of Operations, version 1.0, FAA, March 27, 2014 
 
Elias, B. (2015). Protecting civil aviation from cyberattacks retrieved from 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/IN10296.pdf 
 
FAA Needs to Address Weaknesses in Air Traffic Control Systems, United States Government 
Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters (Information Security). January 2015, 
available at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668169.pdf, accessed May 2016 
 
Furlani, C.M. (2009).  Minimum security requirements for federal information and information systems. 
DIANE Publishing 
 
Global Aviation Cyber Security Market to be Worth $1.B Bn in 2015 According to New Visiongain 
report (n.d.) retrieved from https://www.visiongain.com/Press_Release/787/Global-aviation-cyber-
security-market-to-be-worth-1-8BN-in-2015-According-to-new-Visiongain-report https://www- 
 
IBM to design and Build Advanced Cyber Security Analytics System for the U.S. Federal Aviation 
Administration (2010) Retrieved from www.03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/29782.wss#release 
 
Interoperability Requirements Standard for Baseline 2 ATS Data Communications (Baseline 2  
Interop Standard), RTCA DO-351 REVA, volumes 1 and 2, RTCA SC-214, April 4, 2016 
 
Interoperability Requirements Standard for Baseline 2 ATS Data Communications, FANS 1/A 
Accommodation (FANS 1/A - Baseline 2 Interop Standard), RTCA DO-352 REV A, RTCA SC-214, 
April 4, 2016 
 
Interoperability Requirements Standard for Baseline 2 ATS Data Communications, ATN Baseline 1 
Accommodation (ATN Baseline 1 - Baseline 2 Interop Standard), RTCA DO-353 REVA, version 
1A, RTCA SC-214, April 4, 2016 
 
NextGen Implementation Plan Document, June 2013 
 
Safety and Performance Standard for Baseline 2 ATS Data Communications (Baseline 2 SPR Standard), 
RTCA DO-350, REVA, volumes 1 and 2, RTCA SC-214, April 4, 2016 
 
Shirey, R.W. (2016).  Internet security glossary, 2000. Available at: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2828 
 
Thames, Lane (2015) Did the Aviation Industry Fail Cybersecurity 101 retrieved from 
http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cyber-security/the-aviation-
industry-did-they-fail-cybersecurity-101/ 
 
White, Garry L, CCP,C.I.S.S.P., PhD., Hewitt, B., PhD., & Kruck, S. E., P. (2013). Incorporating global 
information security and assurance in I.S. education. Journal of Information Systems Education, 
24(1), 11-16. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/docview/1438693461?accountid=27203 
 
Williams, James (n.d.) National Airspace System Security Cyber Architecture retrieved from 
https://www.mitre.org/publications/technical-papers/national-airspace-system-security-cyber-
architecture 
 
 
